Guteriano Neves
Introduction
“Legitimate Politics” is
the first goal of the “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” agreed upon by the g7+
members in Monrovia. This is referred to later on as Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding Goals, which were adopted at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness, in November, 2011, as part of New Deal. Based on these goals
also, the performance of so-called “fragile states” is measured against these
goals. Basic assumption is that when state institutions do not enjoy legitimacy
from their citizens, the perceived level of fragility increases.
If we frame legitimacy in the
context of fragility, this implies that fragile states do not have legitimacy
or at best only weak legitimacy from their citizens. Indeed, in order to
progress beyond fragility, fragile states must strengthen their legitimacy. But
the history of the developing world tells us that acquiring legitimacy has
proved to be a difficult pursuit. Even countries that have been independent for
more than half a century still struggle with political legitimacy. This article
discusses some issues related to political legitimacy in Timor-Leste by
critically reflecting on our experience since 1999, and the current economic
and political development.
Citizens’ Lack of Ownership
towards the State
In Timor, a country that just
went through foreign occupation and a pitted struggle against foreign rule,
political participation goes beyond the notion of liberal democracy. During
resistance, people across the spectrums of social class, education level, and
multiple generations participated in the struggle to liberate their homeland
from foreign occupiers. Many revolutionary organizations existed during the
struggle, but these groups were merely symbols that facilitated the process.
Therefore, reflecting critically on the struggle of the Timorese people and the
current state of development, our struggle toward a common goal is embedded in
the Timorese consciousness as a nation. This is the factor that unites Timorese
to imagine themselves as one nation, to refer to Anderson’s “Imagined
Community.” The positive implication is that people had a sense of ownership
and responsibility towards common goals because they felt that these goals
belonged to them and what they were doing was a part of achieving their goals.
But after the country finally won
its independence the situation changed dramatically. The United Nations led the
international community in nation-building in Timor-Leste, unraveling Timorese
unity in the process, especially at the grassroots level. Even the small number
of elites found it hard to find space for political participation. Many
international efforts to “empower” the community resulted in the erosion of
existing local authority, which was driven by the presence of a multitude of
international advisors.
The situation did not change much
after the restoration of independence in 2002. The process then came to be
dominated by local elites, most of whom reside in Dili. The failure of
political parties to channel the aspiration of their constituents in the
development process means that political parties only had real significance
during election cycles and the parties became merely stepping stones for elites
to acquire power.
Before the massive flow of oil
money began flowing into state coffers, many NGOs played the role of
facilitating popular political participation on a small scale, allowing the
people’s voice to be heard through advocacy efforts. But after the flow of petroleum
money began in earnest, and as the state budget increased, and the reducing of
donors’ contribution, the influence of NGOs began to shrink. On the other hand,
the state, dominated by a few elites, grew more powerful. In other words, the
increase in oil money empowered the state, and at the same time reduced the
public sphere for political participation.
The result for the Timorese
people is that they find themselves marginalized because their voices are
barely heard and reflected in the development process. Although it is easy to
call this situation undemocratic, it is hard to swallow for a society that just
underwent a brutal popular struggle. It is like taking away the destiny of the
nation from them. This loss of their voice erodes their sense of being
part of a community. After losing their ability to participate, the Timorese
people feel that the process no longer belongs to them. This ultimately leads
to an erosion of the sense of responsibility of ordinary Timorese citizens
toward the social transformation of this new country.
This is the lesson we should
learn from our experience of nation-state building over the past ten years.
Although we have earned the praise of many international observers, we still
have to reflect critically upon our flaws at nation-building. There are
clear lessons to be learned from our own history.
Invisibility of the State
The modern state we intended to
build is not an institution embedded in our history, nor in the history of
other third world societies. It is a relatively new institution that comes to
us through Western colonialism. Given its novelty in Timor, it is hard for this
new institution to claim legitimacy over citizens who previously lived in small
communities, and who acted according to community-agreed upon norms and
regulations.
Meanwhile, as a post-colonial and
post-conflict society, Timor is also facing multi-dimensional problems. Some of
these are high rates of illiteracy and malnutrition, poor infrastructure,
subsistence agriculture, land-ownership, law enforcement, a culture of “Big
Brother,” and many others. In this circumstance, rather than monopoly over
coercive power, as Weberian notion of state suggests, the capacity of the
state to solve problems inherited by colonialism is what determines political
legitimacy. Thus, the expectation from the people toward the state is very
high. The state is expected to provide social services such as education,
health, water, and sanitation, to develop the economy, to build infrastructure,
to protect citizens’ rights. And the list goes on and on.
It is common in the history of
developing countries after independence. The invisible hand of state is
everywhere and state played part in every aspect of the society. That was how
the state made itself visible to its citizens and fortified its existence.
In Timor-Leste, after
independence, we Timorese expected significant roles of the state. We wanted
the state to provide social services, health services, water and sanitation,
enforced rule of law, the protection of basic rights of its citizens, public works,
and so on.
But these expectations have not
been met, and of course, it will not take a short time to fulfill them. State
visibility has remained very low. Most of state apparatus is located in Dili.
Police, judges, prosecutors, civil servants, are located in Dili. This is
totally disproportionate because only about around 21% of Timorese live in
Dili, but most of public servants are centralized in Dili.
Consequently in the districts,
especially in the villages and remote areas, the state remains almost invisible
to citizens. Although health and education are frequently criticized, in rural
areas we see the state only when our children go to school or when people
receive services at community health centers. How can one honestly speak of
“state legitimacy” to these rural citizens?
Exclusive Economic Growth
What is important for Timor-Leste
is to have an economy where everyone can contribute to growth, everyone is part
of it, and everyone can benefit from it.
Unfortunately, this has not been
the case since independence. Timor’s economy has been dominated by an influx of
international capital that came through foreign aid and by selling the
country’s natural resources. Through this, the state finances all the large
infrastructure projects, pays more than 40,000 civil servants, and keeps the
state machine functioning.
On the other hand, the
agricultural sector—the source of income for 75% of Timorese—continues to
decline 0.8% every year between 2002 and 2010. At the same time, public sector,
which employs more than 40,000 people, increased 1% every year. Services and
industry are still stagnant. (Source: Ministry of Finance statistics.)
This tells a lot about the
economic structure of Timorese society. First, it implies that 75% of Timorese
who depend on the agriculture sector are getting poorer and more vulnerable to
poverty incidence, whereas those involved in the public sector are doing
better. Second, it implies that 75% of Timorese are less participative and less
productive in contributing to national economic growth. Consequently, people
began to shift from agriculture sector and yet, hard to find jobs in other
sectors.
In a country where the state does
not heavily depend on exporting its natural resources, the burden of the state
to provide good services is very high, because the state relies on citizens’
contribution in various forms. But in a country like Timor-Leste, where the
state’s domestically generated revenues are only about 8% of state annual
budget, the incentive for the state to provide basic services is almost
nonexistent. In the end, our economy is not a participatory and inclusive
economy, generated by Timorese. Rather, it is driven by an influx of foreign
capital from petroleum revenues. Politically, since the state does not depend
on Timorese citizens to finance and maintain its apparatus, it does not feel
that it has to be accountable to them. It does not need to tax its citizens,
not even the rich, because the state receives a lot of money from petroleum
revenues. Similarly, Timorese people do not view the State’s money as belonging
to the citizens of the country.
This mutual lack of financial
dependence might appear simple, but it has highly detrimental effect. It
erodes the work ethic in the public sector because individuals lack a sense of
responsibility to their fellow citizens even though they get paid by the state.
It erodes the sense of belonging and responsibility of every citizen to
contribute. And at the end of the day, it changes the nature of the social contract
upon which the modern state is based.
Conclusion
When we talk about political
legitimacy, our own experiences provide us with many lessons. Our struggle for
independence was popular, participative, and inclusive. Everyone therefore felt
that they played a role and were part of a process. However, since 1999, when
we reflect critically upon how our nation-state has been built, we find that
lack of Timorese ownership and the state’s lack of a visible presence outside
of Dili, as well as the Timorese economic structure are very exclusive. By
highlighting these issues, we realize that our structural issues undermine the
political legitimacy of the state. Lastly, in order to acquire political
legitimacy, all of us have to work to transform these problems
Author is Researcher at
Timor-Leste’s Presidential Research Center.
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